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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRADLEY CLYDE GOODRICH, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44239
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-8425
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Bradley Goodrich contends that the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed and executed his sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction over the case.
Specifically, he asserts the district court failed to sufficiently consider the sentencing
goals of rehabilitation and protection of society in doing so, as the mitigating factors in
this case reveal those goals would be better served by retaining jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the sentencing order and remand this case with
instructions to retain jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
When Mr. Goodrich was thirteen, he witnessed his mother shoot and kill his
adoptive father in a case of mistaken identity. (See Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.192-93, 207.) His mother was subsequently convicted of second
degree murder and served time in prison, during which time Mr. Goodrich moved to
California to try and support himself.

(PSI, p.193.)

Unfortunately, Mr. Goodrich

developed a destructive lifestyle, which included abusing alcohol and drugs, such as
marijuana.

(Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.12.)

Nevertheless, Mr. Goodrich was able to

persevere and lived a mostly law-abiding life, except for a brief period of time when he
was going through a divorce. (See Tr., p.43, L.6 - p.44, L.6.)1
Things began to change in 2013, when Mr. Goodrich suffered a back injury while
on the job, which left him unable to work.

(See PSI, p.197.)

He was prescribed

hydrocodone until 2015, and he became addicted to that medication. (Tr., p.30, Ls.610.) During that time, he also began using methamphetamine. (Tr., p.30, Ls.9-10.) His
situation continued to devolve, which ended with him providing methamphetamine to a
sixteen-year-old girl, with whom he had fostered a romantic, then a sexual, relationship.
(See, e.g., R., pp.64-67.) Ultimately, Mr. Goodrich was charged with several counts of
sexual battery of a minor and several other charges related to his own possession of
methamphetamine, as well as providing methamphetamine to the victim.

(See

R., pp.64-67.)

While the transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and
paginated volumes, unless otherwise indicated, references to “Tr.” refer to the volume
containing the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on April 25, 2016.
1
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Goodrich pleaded guilty to one count of
sexual battery of a minor and one count of possession of a controlled substance.
(Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.9-14.)

In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the

remaining charges, as well as charges in another case (though it retained the ability to
argue the facts of the dismissed charges at sentencing), and recommend a sentence
with two years fixed. (Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.12-22.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recommended an aggregate
underlying sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, with a period of retained
jurisdiction so that the court could assess Mr. Goodrich’s potential for rehabilitation.
(Tr., p.40, Ls.13-25.) Defense counsel noted Mr. Goodrich’s moderate and increasing
desire for, and amenability to, change. (Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.) The district court
acknowledged several of the mitigating factors, even agreeing with Mr. Goodrich’s
concern that the victim’s report carried an element of exaggeration.

(Tr., p.45,

Ls.15-22.) However, it decided not to retain jurisdiction, but rather, to impose and
execute a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed on the sexual battery
charge and a concurrent five years sentence, with two years fixed, on the possession
charge. (Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) It explained that it did not want to discount the possibility
that Mr. Goodrich could become a law-abiding citizen again at some point in the future,
but clarified, “the primary focus of this sentence was punishment for the bad behavior
that occurred here.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-14.)
Mr. Goodrich filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.183, 188.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and executed
Mr. Goodrich’s sentence.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed Mr. Goodrich’s
Sentence
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App.
1982).

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s

sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society;
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of
society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

Therefore, a sentence which protects society and also

accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).

This is because the protection of society is

influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in
sentencing.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.

However, the Idaho

Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial
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consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103
(2015).
The district court’s focus was not on either the primary goal or the initial
consideration of sentencing. Rather, it stated, “the primary focus of this sentence was
punishment for the bad behavior that occurred here.” (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-5.) While that is a
valid consideration, it should not be the primary focus of the sentence, particularly
given all the mitigating factors present in this case. For instance, Mr. Goodrich, who
was fifty-six years old at the time of sentencing (PSI, p.182), had significant periods of
law-abiding behavior. (See PSI, pp.188-91.) He was able to do so despite witnessing a
truly tragic event which ultimately resulted in him developing a destructive lifestyle
involving drug and alcohol abuse. (See Tr., p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.12.) Additionally, he was
only unable to maintain his mostly law-abiding lifestyle when a work-place injury
resulted in a new set of addictions, which in turn, fueled his decisions with the victim in
this case. (See, e.g., Tr., p.33, Ls.1-13.)
To that point, Mr. Goodrich did express remorse, and accepted responsibility, for
his conduct, particularly in regard to the charge of giving drugs to the victim.
(PSI, p.187; Tr., p.42, Ls.16-23.) Acknowledgment of guilt, even if limited, still indicates
that he is taking the first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,
815 (Ct. App. 2010). And, as defense counsel explained, Mr. Goodrich has a moderate
and growing desire to continue that process.

(Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.)

Furthermore, as the psychosexual evaluation revealed, Mr. Goodrich’s risk to reoffend
was the product of dynamic factors, i.e., factors that were capable of changing through
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rehabilitative efforts. (See PSI, pp.162-63 (explaining Mr. Goodrich’s score in regard to
dynamic risk factors was high); compare PSI, pp.158-59 (explaining that Mr. Goodrich’s
score in regard to static, or unchangeable, risk factors was only low-moderate).) As
such, it recommended treatment in a supervised scenario. (See PSI, p.178; cf. Tr., p.21,
Ls.7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging that recommendation).)
For these reasons, defense counsel explained a period of retained jurisdiction
would best serve the goals of sentencing because it would provide the district court with
additional information on Mr. Goodrich’s growing dedication to, and ability to complete,
a rehabilitative program, and so, more quickly return to being a productive member of
society. (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-23.) That is, after all, the purpose of allowing the district
courts to retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990)
(“The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial
court additional time for evaluation of the defendant’s rehabilitation potential and
suitability for probation.”). And, as defense counsel acknowledged (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-23),
if the district court was not satisfied with Mr. Goodrich’s performance during the period
of retained jurisdiction, it could still relinquish jurisdiction and require Mr. Goodrich to
serve the underlying sentence. See, e.g., State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998)
(affirming an order revoking probation despite a recommendation from the rider staff
that the defendant be placed on probation).
Furthermore, while the district court did acknowledge some of the mitigating
factors (see, e.g., Tr., p.47, Ls.10-20), it did not sufficiently consider their full impact in
regard to all the sentencing factors. Rather, it considered those factors in regard to how
they affected the amount of punishment it would order. (See, e.g., Tr., p.47, Ls.10-22
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(explaining that, because of Mr. Goodrich’s demonstrated ability to overcome prior
addictions and live a law-abiding lifestyle, “it is for that reason I’m not giving you a
longer sentence than I do. I could send you to prison for life.”).) The district court did
not, for example, sufficiently appreciate the impact of those factors on the potential for
actually addressing Mr. Goodrich’s underlying issues through a timely opportunity for
rehabilitation. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.5-14 (the district court simply articulating the hope that
Mr. Goodrich can become a productive member of society at some unspecified point in
the future).)

Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have

recognized that the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important consideration at
sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,
91 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Eubank,
114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988).
Furthermore, providing for rehabilitative opportunities actually provides better
protection to society in the long-term because it actually addresses the issues which
underlie the criminal conduct. This is particularly true in Mr. Goodrich’s case, where his
risk to reoffend is the product of dynamic, changeable factors. (See PSI, pp.158, 163.)
Therefore, in this case, a sentence which sufficiently considers all the goals of
sentencing would take the opportunity to change those dynamic factors through a timely
rehabilitative program. (See PSI, p.178 (the psychosexual evaluation recommending
precisely that); cf. Tr., p.21, Ls, 7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging that
recommendation).)

Thus, the district court’s decision to focus on the goal of
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punishment to the detriment of the goals of protection of society and rehabilitation
constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Goodrich respectfully requests that this Court vacate the sentencing order
and remand his case with instructions to retain jurisdiction.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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